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Abstract: We present evidence that ethnic fragmentation explains variations in per capita income, 
institutions, and schooling better than income inequality. To do so, we identify instruments for ethnic 
fractionalization and income inequality based on historical experience and geography. Using 
instrumental variables estimation, we find that ethnic fractionalization explains the level of income both 
when income inequality is included as a control in the estimation and when it is not.  However, we find 
inconsistent evidence that income inequality affects development when ethnic fractionalization is 
properly treated as an endogenous variable.  If anything, the evidence we have suggests that income 
inequality is positively related to economic development. 
 
 
 
Key Words:  Inequality; Ethnic Fractionalization; Growth 
 
JEL Codes:  O11, O15, O16 
 
 
*Corresponding author:  198 College Hill Road, Clinton, NY 13323; phone:  315-859-4419, fax:  315-
859-4477
1 Introduction 
 A large literature finds a role for income inequality in affecting economic development both in 
the presence of credit market imperfections and without.  The channels through which income inequality 
have been posited to work are numerous.  For example, in a seminal paper, Galor and Zeira (1993) show 
that inequality can affect human capital accumulation-- and, therefore, growth-- in the presence of credit 
market imperfections. Galor and Moav (2004) extend this idea by arguing that inequality can be harmful 
in earlier stages of development when large investments in physical capital are primary drivers of 
growth but that the effects observed in Galor and Zeira (1993) may dominate later on. Moreover, 
Persson and Tabellini (1994) show how inequality can affect physical capital accumulation via a 
demand for redistributive policies, Alesina and Perotti (1996) argue that inequality affects physical 
capital investment through its effect on political instability, and Banerjee and Newman (1993) 
demonstrate a role for income inequality in affecting occupational choice and the extent of 
entrepreneurship.  Others have linked inequality to the development of low quality institutions as the 
political elite block institutional reform that would benefit the country as a whole but challenge their 
own dominance (e.g. Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2001,  2005; Engerman and Sokoloff, 1997, 
2000).1
At the same time, others have focused on the negative impact of a related but different aspect of 
societal division—ethnic fractionalization.  Easterly and Levine (1997) show the negative consequences 
of ethnic diversity while paying particular attention to  African development and argue that 
fractionalization interferes with the provision of growth promoting public goods.  Others have 
confirmed the consequences of ethnic fractionalization (e.g. Alesina et. al. 2003), but Alesina and La 
Ferrara (2005) argue that ethnic diversity only has negative consequences in democracies where the lack 
of ability to coordinate across different ethnic groups may have more severe consequences.  Importantly 
for our work, Alesina et al (2003) and Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) also argue that ethnic diversity is 
  
                                                          
1 See Galor (2009a, 2009b) for brief but comprehensive treatments of the literature on inequality and growth.  
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endogenous and careful examinations of the role of ethnic diversity in affecting economic outcomes 
must take that into account. Ashraf and Galor (forthcoming) argue that genetic diversity can be 
beneficial at intermediate levels by spurring faster innovation but that the negative effects discussed here 
take over at higher levels, creating a U-shaped pattern. 
In addition, Engerman and Sokoloff (1997, 2000) argue that ethnic diversity may have also 
played a role in the development of institutions by allowing the elites to readily identify a group that 
could be excluded from privileges such as landholding or suffrage.  Thus, ethnic fractionalization may 
have negative impacts on development independent of the level of economic inequality. Indeed, their 
work highlights two potential roles of ethnicity in political development:  it can be a tool for 
identification or a potential ideological fault line.  Thus, a priori, it is unclear whether ethnic differences 
or income inequality are both playing independent roles in long run development. 
  In spite of a strong theoretical foundation for the effects of inequality on development, robust 
empirical evidence has been difficult to find.  Clarke (1995) and Deininger and Squire (1998) find 
evidence that inequal ity is harmful for growth. Forbes (2000) finds that inequality has a positive effect 
on growth while Banerjee and Duflo (2003) find an inverted U relationship between growth rates and 
changes in the income distribution.  Furthermore, they argue that it is difficult to interpret any of these 
correlations causally because of difficult identification problems.  In an effort to address the 
identification issue, Easterly (2001a, 2007) uses characteristics of the land that might support plantation-
based economies as instruments for inequality.  He concludes that inequality is associated with lower 
levels of income, schooling and quality of institutions.  Importantly, Easterly (2007) uses a variety of 
control variables, including ethnic fractionalization (treated as an exogenous variable) to demonstrate 
that income inequality is a robust determinant of the level of income per capita. 
In contrast to the empirical literature relating income inequality to development, there is less 
debate about the negative consequences of ethnic fractionalization, at least in certain circumstances.  
The vast majority of this literature, however, treats fractionalization as exogenous. While treating ethnic 
fractionalization as exogenous may be an appropriate specification in classic growth regressions 
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spanning 30 or so years, it is less acceptable over the longer time spans implicit in income level 
regressions (Alesina et al, 2003). Specifically, most migration occurs into those countries with higher 
levels of economic and institutional development, implying that OLS coefficients will underestimate the 
negative impacts of ethnic diversity (Mayda, 2005; Freeman, 2006). Moreover, ethnic diversity may 
hinder the development of institutions and provisions of public goods while countries are in the early 
stages of development, but have a smaller (or non-existent) negative impact once the institutions of 
democracy and rule of law have been implemented (e.g. Easterly, 2001b). Finally, a somewhat distinct 
literature demonstrates how national boundaries may be endogenous, which could create reverse 
causality between fractionalization and income per capita (e.g. Alesina and Spolaore, 1997; Alesina, 
Spolaore, and Wacziarg, 2005).     
Recently, however, the treatment of ethnic fractionalization as an exogenous variable has begun 
to change.  Michalopoulos (forthcoming) uses geographic variation to identify causes of 
fractionalization but does not relate fractionalization to income per capita. Similarly, Ahlerup and 
Olsson (forthcoming) appeal to an evolutionary framework, showing that ethnic fractionalization is 
positively related to an indicator of the duration of human settlement.  Ahlerup (2010) directly addresses 
the endogeneity issue by treating fractionalization as endogenous when estimating its effects on income 
per capita and uses this framework to compare the effects of fractionalization and property rights 
institutions when both are treated as endogenous. His work does not, however, investigate the role of 
income inequality.  In related work, Ashraf and Galor (forthcoming) use migratory distance from the 
location of human origins to predict genetic diversity and demonstrates an inverted U relationship 
between genetic diversity and income per capita. 
We build on recent work by Putterman and Weil (2010) and Ahlerup and Olsson (forthcoming) 
on the historical determinants of inequality and ethnic fractionalization that identifies suitable 
instruments for examining the relative roles of ethnic fractionalization and income inequality.  We find 
that ethnic fragmentation is an important determinant of per capita income, school enrollment and 
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institutional quality. Most importantly, we demonstrate that, when income inequality and ethnic 
fractionalization are simultaneously added as endogenous variables in such regressions, ethnic diversity 
has a negative and significant effect while income inequality enters with a positive and usually 
statistically insignificant effect. These results are robust to numerous controls and different estimation 
strategies. The results also clearly indicate that fractionalization must be treated as an endogenous 
variable.  
Our results are important because, although income inequality and ethnic fractionalization may 
be correlated empirically, the channels through which ethnic fractionalization affect economic 
development may be different than those through which income inequality affects economic growth.  
There are policy implications to this finding as well:  the best policy to remedy the deleterious effects of 
ethnic fractionalization may be very different from one aimed at alleviating the effects of income 
inequality. 
To the extent that ethnic fractionalization is a cause of income inequality or perhaps tells us 
something about the nature of the inequality, our results suggest that there are certain types of inequality 
that are worse for economic development than others.  In other words, our results are consistent with the 
idea that inequality that is perpetuated by ethnic divisions may be particularly bad for economic 
growth.  In that sense, to the extent that ethnic fractionalization affects growth via political or 
institutional channels rather than via factor accumulation, our findings complement those who argue that 
political inequality may lead to instability or lack of cohesion which lowers growth (e.g., Alesina and 
Perotti, 1996; Rodrik, 1999; Easterly, Ritzen and Woolcock, 2006). Also, our findings are consistent 
with the arguments in the strand of the inequality and growth literature that links inequality to the 
development of low quality institutions if exploiting ethnic divisions is a way for the elite to maintain 
their economic and political power when faced with growing domestic agitation for equal rights or when 
balancing inconsistencies inherent in arguing for freedom from colonizing powers while promoting the 
continuance of slavery (e.g. Engerman and Sokoloff, 1997, 2000).  
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2 Empirical Results 
 Our goal is to show that ethnic fractionalization and associated levels of inequality better 
explain poor growth performance than income inequality in general.  To provide convincing empirical 
results, we will base our specifications on earlier empirical work demonstrating the link between 
inequality and growth (Easterly, 2001a, 2007).  As mentioned in the introduction, our contention is that 
the forces that led to inequality also led to ethnic fractionalization. In particular, earlier literature 
attempts to identify geographic instruments that lead to inequality by providing incentives to develop 
plantations, which bred both inequality and ethnic divisions. Our departure from previous literature, 
which leads us to different conclusions, is that we will treat both fractionalization and inequality as 
endogenous variables.  
2.1 Treating Fractionalization as an Endogenous Variable 
We start by showing that previous results about the effect of inequality are not robust to treating 
ethnic fractionalization as endogenous.  As mentioned above, Easterly (2007) uses land quality as an 
instrument for income inequality, treating ethnic fractionalization as exogenous.  However, we show 
that, in addition to predicting income inequality, land quality also predicts ethnic fractionalization.  The 
instrument used by Easterly (2007) is the likelihood that a country would export sugar or wheat. 
Specifically, the variable, LWHEATSUGAR, is defined as log (1+area of land suitable for growing 
wheat/1+area of land suitable for growing sugar). This data originally comes from the United Nations’ 
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO 2000). Easterly (2007) demonstrates that LWHEATSUGAR is 
significantly correlated with two measures of inequality: the percent of income controlled by the top 
20% (INCSHARE) and the Gini coefficient (GINI), which are taken from the WIDER (2000) database. 
Both are averaged over the period of 1960-1998 in order reduce measurement error and are adjusted to 
account for biases introduced by different survey measurement techniques. Summary statistics, data 
descriptions and sources are provided for all the variables used in the paper in Appendix Table 1. 
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 1 replicate the Easterly (2007) results for income inequality and 
Column 3 of Table 1 shows that we obtain similar results when we use LWHEATSUGAR to predict 
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ethnic fractionalization.2
We show this point by presenting the estimation results of the effects of fractionalization and 
inequality when land quality is used as an instrument for each in separate regressions in Panel A of 
Table 2.  Columns 1 and 4 present results when the Gini coefficient and the income share of the top 20 
percent are used as measures of inequality and the dependent variable is the log of per capita income in 
2002.
 The measure of fractionalization, originally from Alesina et al (2003), is the 
likelihood that two randomly selected individuals will be from different ethno-linguistic groups. The 
results in Table 1 suggest that a one standard deviation increase in LWHEATSUGAR  decreases 
fractionalization, income share and the Gini coefficient by .37, .44, and .41 standard deviations 
respectively.  The R-squared values for each simple regression in Table 1 are similar and, given the 
theoretical reasons to link land quality to both income inequality and ethnic fractionalization, this 
suggests that land quality may be just as good an instrument for ethnic fractionalization as it is for 
income inequality. 
3
As mentioned earlier, two ways in which inequality and fractionalization have been 
hypothesized to affect growth is via the accumulation of human capital or via the development of 
institutions.  To see if there is evidence for these channels in our data we also report similar regressions 
in Table 2, using a measure of human capital accumulation and institution quality.  So our results can be 
comparable to the previous literature we again use the same variables employed by Easterly (2007), 
GOVERNANCE, an aggregate measure of institutional quality from Kauffman, Kraay and Zoibo (2002) 
and secondary school enrollment rates averaged from 1998-2002 (SCHOOL).   These results appear in 
  These results replicate those in Easterly (2007).  However, in column 7 we report results when 
we substitute fractionalization for inequality and find that fractionalization also has the expected 
negative effect on income per capita.   
                                                          
2 We initially use the same sample as Easterly (2007) to show that our results are not due to a change in sample.  
Later, we are able to expand the sample. 
3 We use the log of income per capita in 2002 so that our results can be directly compared to those in Easterly 
(2007). 
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the remaining columns of Table 2 and show that in all cases, both inequality and fractionalization are 
significantly and negatively associated with institutional quality and schooling enrollments. 
In Panel B of Table 2, we repeat the estimations results after adding the share of arable land in 
the tropics (tropical) as a second instrument in order test the over identification restrictions.  Again, the 
explanatory variable is significant at the 1% level in all nine regressions and, more importantly, 
fractionalization passes the overidentification test in all three regressions, implying that the tests fails to 
reject the null hypothesis that LWHEATSUGAR and tropical affect the dependent variables through 
channels other than ethnic division. Importantly, diagnostic tests indicate that both inequality and 
fractionalization are endogenous. The test of endogeneity, which is in the last row of Table 2, is the 
difference between the Sargan-Hansen statistics when treating the potentially endogenous regressor as 
endogenous and exogenous. The null hypothesis is that the variable can be treated as exogenous and, in 
all specifications, this null hypothesis is soundly rejected for both inequality and fractionalization. 
So, we have found that ethnic fractionalization and income inequality present equally plausible 
explanations for why the historical experience of countries as “plantation economies” is associated with 
slower growth than that experienced by their counterparts.   Easterly (2007) demonstrates that his results 
for income inequality are robust to number of control variables, including commodity exporting 
indicator variable, the share of arable land in the tropics, legal heritage and continent dummies.  We do 
not replicate his results in order to conserve space but do show similar estimations when ethnic 
fractionalization is treated as the endogenous variable.  These results are in Table 3.   In 11 of the 12 
specifications, ethnic fractionalization is significant at the 5% level or better. When using income per 
capita as the dependent variable and adding tropical as a control, FRAC is significant at the 10% level 
(p-value of .06). Once again, diagnostic tests indicate that fractionalization should be treated as 
endogenous. 
2.2 The “Horserace” 
 Because both fractionalization and income inequality appear to be important determinants of 
long-run development when investigated separately, we now enter them simultaneously into 
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instrumental variables regressions.  This “horserace” technique allows us to determine which variable 
exerts a greater effect and is similar to the approach taken by Acemoglu and Johnson (2005), Rodrik 
Subramanian and Trebbi (2004), and Easterly and Levine (2003) who attempt to determine the relative 
importance of competing factors that could influence growth. As we noted earlier, the two variables are 
correlated and the reason for similar results when using each one separately may be that one is proxying 
for the other.  Of course, to employ a valid estimation technique, it is beneficial to have one instrument 
that predicts income inequality, but not ethnic fractionalization and one instrument that predicts 
fractionalization but not inequality. 
Fortunately, recent literature on the historical determinants of current inequality and 
fractionalization provides us with such instruments.  Putterman and Weil (2010) show that the standard 
deviation of state history (heterogeneity in the early development of the current population’s ancestors) 
is related to current day income inequality.4  We use this as an instrument for income inequality (in 
addition to the mean of adjusted state history as a control).  To instrument for ethnic fractionalization, 
we rely on geographic features of the country, specifically, the natural logs of distance to a coast or a 
river and the absolute value of latitude.  Ahlerup and Olsson (forthcoming) also use these geographic 
features as determinants of ethnic fractionalization.  They argue that latitude is related to climatic 
variability, habitat diversity, and pathogen loads, which affect a local population’s reach and migration, 
with greater variability encouraging the population to spread out more geographically and more 
pathogen’s limiting migration in and out of a region.  In addition, they suggest that populations that are 
closer to the coast or other waterways are less isolated and will be less fractionalized.5   We use both 
distance to coast or river and latitude as instruments for fractionalization.6
                                                          
4 See Putterman and Weil (2010) for a detailed description of the construction of this measure.  Underlying data is 
from Putterman, Louis. State Antiquity Index (available online) and Putterman, Louis and David Weil. World 
Migration Matrix, 1500 – 2000 (available online). 
     
 
5 Ahlerup and Olsson (2011) also explain linguistic fractionalization with a variable that captures the duration of 
uninterrupted human settlement, origtime.  We use a different measure of fractionalization that incorporates both 
linguistic and racial diversity and do not find that origtime is a significant predictor of this measure of 
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As we explain below, although so far we have employed Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS) so 
that our results are comparable to previous literature, we will perform subsequent instrumental variables 
estimation using Limited Information Maximum Likelihood (LIML).  Although this is a single equation 
technique, we can write the structural model as follows:   
𝐹𝑅𝐴𝐶𝑖 = 𝛽11𝐶𝑂𝐴𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐼𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑖 + 𝛽12𝐿𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑇𝑈𝐷𝐸𝑖 + 𝛽13𝑆𝐷𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑇𝐸𝐻𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑖+ 𝛽14𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑇𝐸𝐻𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑖 +  𝛽15𝑾𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
𝐼𝑁𝐸𝑄𝑖 = 𝛽21𝑆𝐷𝑆𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑇𝐸𝐻𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑖 + 𝛽22𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑇𝐸𝐻𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑖+  𝛽23𝐶𝑂𝐴𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐼𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑖 + 𝛽24𝐿𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑇𝑈𝐷𝐸𝑖 + 𝛽25𝑿𝑖 + 𝜔𝑖 
    𝑦𝑖 = 𝛾1𝐹𝑅𝐴𝐶𝑖 + 𝛾2𝐼𝑁𝐸𝑄𝑖 + +𝛾3𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑇𝐸𝐻𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑖 + 𝜹𝒁𝑖 + 𝜇𝑖     
                
where FRAC is ethnic fractionalization, INEQ is either the income share of the richest quintile or the 
Gini coefficient, and 𝑦 is the log of real income per capita in 2000,7
                                                                                                                                                                                         
fractionalization once latitude and distance from coasts or rivers are also included.  Including origtime as an 
instrument does not change our conclusions, however. 
 secondary school enrollment rates 
(average of 1998 to 2002 values), or the Kaufman, Kraay, and Ziobo (2002) measure of good 
governance. As mentioned above, the instruments, COASTRIVER , LATITUDE, SDSTATEHIST are 
the natural log of distance to the coast or a river, the natural log of the absolute value of latitude, and the 
standard deviation of state history calculated by Putterman and Weil (2010).  Consistent with our 
reasoning above, we expect β13, β23, and β24 to be equal to zero.  Control variables in the estimation 
include regional dummy variables and dummy variables for legal heritage. As noted earlier in our 
discussion of Table 3, Easterly also controls for share of arable land in a tropical location and a 
commodity exporting dummy. We do not report these as part of our main specification because these 
variables do not enter the estimations significantly and their inclusion does not alter our qualitative 
conclusions.  
6 Our use of absolute value of latitude is similar to Easterly’s use of the share of tropical land. We prefer to use 
latitude in our main specifications because it varies over a wide range of countries and is used in Ahlerup and 
Olsson (2011) to predict fractionalization. 
7 Switching to the log of GDP in 2000 rather than Easterly’s measure for 2002 allows us to greatly expand the 
sample. 
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The specification above is over-identified.  In this case, Limited Information Maximum 
Likelihood (LIML) provides coefficients that are less biased than Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS) if 
instruments are weak, although those estimates are less precise.  Because of this, conclusions based on 
LIML results are more robust.  Earlier, we presented results from 2SLS to provide the most direct 
comparison to previous literature.  However, going forward, we use LIML for overidentified 
specifications.8
Although LIML is a single equation technique, we can still verify the expected relationships 
between inequality, fractionalization and the instruments described above.  Results from the reduced 
form estimates of inequality and fractionalization are in Table 4.  The first three columns examine the 
determinants of fractionalization, the middle three columns examine the Gini coefficients, and the last 
three columns present results for the income share of the richest quintile.  These results are in line with 
the expectations we outlined above.  The standard deviation of state history is a positive and statistically 
significant predictor of both measures of inequality, but not consistently of ethnic fractionalization.  
Conversely, the natural log of the distance to a coast or river and of the absolute value of latitude are  
significant predictors of ethnic fractionalization, but not consistent predictors of income inequality.   
  
We report the results of our LIML estimations in Tables 5 and 6.  In Table 5, the measure of 
income inequality used is the Gini coefficient.  In Table 6, the income share of the top 20% is used.  
Prior to examining the main results, we first examine further specification tests that assure us of the 
validity of our estimation strategy.  Specifically, in the bottom rows of Tables 5 and 6, we report several 
tests of underidentification and weak identification that support our efforts to separately identify the 
effects of inequality and fractionalization.  The AP F-statistic is the Angrist-Pischke (2009) first stage F-
statistic, which measures the strength of the instruments separately after controlling for the predicted 
values of the other endogenous variable.  Low F-statistics indicate that we cannot reject the null 
                                                          
8 As we explain later, we are able to reject the hypothesis of weak instruments in the LIML estimations for most of 
our specifications based on Stock and Yogo (2005) critical values.  In addition, we find that overidentified 2SLS  
results are qualitatively similar to LIML results.  Nonetheless, we report LIML estimates for overidentified models 
because of their superiority.  (Angrist and Pischke (2009, p. 210). 
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hypothesis that the instruments do not separately identify the endogenous variables—i.e., the 
specification is underidentified.  In all cases, we can comfortably reject this null hypothesis.  A stronger 
specification test, however, would also test for weak identification.  It is well known that weak 
instruments result in biased coefficients and very weak instruments can result in a bias that is as large as 
the OLS bias (Stock and Wright, 2000).  However, using the Stock and Yogo (2005) critical values for a 
test of weak instruments based on LIML size, we find that in all but two specifications in Table 5, at the 
5 percent significance level, the maximum size of the Wald test is less than .15, indicating that our 
estimation does not suffer from weak instruments.9  To provide a more intuitive interpretation of the 
strength of our instruments, we also report the Shea’s Partial R2 for each of the endogenous variables in 
the first stage regressions.  The adjusted Shea’s partial R2 takes into account the correlation between the 
instruments.  Although there is much variation in each of these regressions that is unexplained, they do 
suggest that each endogenous variable can be separately identified with these instruments.  Finally, 
Table 5 reports the results of a test of overidentifying restrictions, OIR, providing another measure of 
the validity of our instruments. 10
 We turn now to interpreting the main results of our instrumental variables estimation in Table 5.  
The first three columns examine income per capita, while the remaining six columns examine 
determinants of income per capita that may be influenced by inequality or fractionalization.  Focusing 
first on the results for income per capita, we see that fractionalization has a strong negative effect on 
income per capita, while inequality actually has a positive effect that is statistically significant at the five 
percent level.  These results show a meaningful role for fractionalization in determining income.  For 
example, the results in column 1 predict that a one standard deviation increase in fractionalization (.25) 
  The results of all of these tests are particularly important in our 
context because we have two endogenous variables and the instruments may be correlated.  However, in 
sum, these diagnostic results suggest that our instruments are valid for identifying separate effects of 
inequality and fractionalization. 
                                                          
9 The exceptions are in columns 2 and 8.  However, even in these cases, the maximum size is estimated to be less 
than .20. 
10 We report p-values from the Hansen J-test for overidentifying restrictions.  
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would generate a 1.9 decrease in the log of GDP per capita.   To determine if our results may be affected 
by omitted variables, we add legal heritage and continent dummies, the same control variables used by 
Easterly (2007), in columns 2 and 3.  The magnitude of the coefficient for fractionalization decreases, 
but remains negative and significant at the one percent level.  In contrast, the results for the Gini 
coefficient in the first three columns of Table 5 suggest that income inequality actually has a positive 
effect on income per capita.  
 The remaining columns of Table 5 examine the determinants of two variables through which 
income inequality or fractionalization may affect income per capita.  In columns four through six, we 
report results of the estimation of the Kaufman, Kraay and Ziobo (2002) measure of good governance.  
As mentioned above, both income inequality and ethnic fractionalization have been theoretically linked 
to the development of weak institutions and poor governance.  Our results find support for a negative 
link between fractionalization and poor governance, but we do not find evidence of the link between 
inequality and governance.  This result is potentially important as it calls into question theories that link 
income inequality and weak institutions (e.g. Engerman and Sokoloff, 1997, 2000; Acemoglu, Johnson 
and Robinson, 2005).  Our results suggest that it may be more appropriate to refine these theories to 
explicitly include elites that are identified by their membership in specific ethnic groups and not solely 
based on an income class.  In columns seven through nine, we report estimation results for secondary 
school enrollments.   Parallel to the results for income per capita, we find that income inequality is 
associated with higher enrollment rates and fractionalization is associated with significantly lower.  The 
magnitude of the estimated effects of fractionalization are potentially devastating to economic 
development:  the results in column 7 predict that a one standard deviation increase in fractionalization 
(.25) would decrease secondary school enrollment rates by 54 percentage points.  As above, these results 
suggest that theories of access to education should specifically address membership in ethnic groups.   
In Table 6, we replicate the Table 5 results using income share of the top quintile instead of the 
Gini coefficient as a measure of inequality.  The conclusions from these alternative estimations are 
broadly consistent with those in Table 5; however, we are not as confident in our identification strategy 
13 
 
when we use income share of the rich as the measure of inequality.  Specifically, the Kleibergen-Paap 
statistic does not allow us to reject a maximum size of the Wald test as high as .20 in most 
specifications; therefore, we cannot conclude that this specification does not suffer from weak 
instruments.  The difference in the two specifications, of course, is the measure of inequality and these 
results suggest that the standard deviation of state history is a better instrument for the Gini coefficient 
than for the share of income of the top quintile.  Given that the standard deviation of state history applies 
to the entire population and that the Gini coefficient measures income inequality throughout the entire 
distribution while the income share of the top 20 percent only examines part of the distribution, this 
finding appears reasonable.  Going forward, we will focus our analysis with the use of the Gini 
coefficient as the measure of income inequality.  Nonetheless, the results we have obtained so far 
suggest that fractionalization is negatively associated with income, good governance, and secondary 
school enrollment rates.  In contrast, income inequality is either positively related to these indicators of 
development or not related in a statistically significant way. 
Why are our results different from those found by previous authors?  The main difference in our 
approach is that we treat ethnic fractionalization as an endogenous variable in the estimation of income 
per capita.  As we argued earlier, changes in income per capita can induce migration over the long-run 
which would affect the ethnic diversity of a country’s population.  If high incomes induced migration, 
treating ethnic diversity as exogenous causes the coefficient on ethnic diversity to be biased upwards, 
counteracting the hypothesized negative effect of ethnic fractionalization on income. 
2.3 Fractionalization and Good Governance 
 To gain more insight into the ways in which inequality and fractionalization affect economic 
development, we provide more detailed results on the determination of specific aspects of good 
governance that comprise the overall Kaufman, Kraay and Ziobo (2002) measure.   Results reported in 
Table 7 examine individual governance indicators: measures of “voice and accountability” (VOICE), 
“political stability” (STABILITY), “government efficiency” (GOVEFFECT), “regulation quality” 
(REGQUAL), “rule of law” (RULELAW) and “corruption” (CORRUPT).  Fractionalization enters 
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negatively and significantly in all 18 specifications, suggesting that ethnic diversity has a negative effect 
on all of the different aspects of “good governance” comprising the aggregate index.  The estimation 
method used in Table 7 treats both fractionalization and inequality as endogenous in the determination 
of governance.  This would be the case if good governance affects migration and therefore ethnic 
diversity and if governance affects income distribution.  Both are plausible scenarios and, in fact, the 
tests for endogeneity (bottom rows of Table 9) indicate that the null hypothesis of exogenous 
fractionalization can be rejected at the 5% level in the majority of specifications.  The null hypothesis 
for the Gini coefficient can be rejected in several, but fewer, specifications.  Interestingly, income 
inequality is only statistically significant in one of these estimations and always estimated with a 
positive coefficient, suggesting that, after controlling for fractionalization, income inequality does not 
have a robust effect on governance. 
3 Discussion  
 While this paper has focused on comparing the effects of inequality and ethnic fractionalization, 
we view our results as complementary to the growing literature on the effects of income inequality (e.g. 
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2005; Engerman and Sokoloff, 1997, 2000; Easterly, 2007). Recent 
literature focuses on how inequality prevents the emergence of political systems that provide basic 
market-supporting institutions and public goods. The idea is that elites resist such institutions because 
they will allow the majority of the population to challenge their privileged position. Thus, the economic 
elites use their power to protect their own position at the expense of total economic growth.   
A long literature on ethnic fractionalization suggests similar outcomes emerging through similar 
but distinct mechanisms. Specifically, different factions struggle to ensure that the allocation of 
government resources disproportionately benefit their own side. This struggle prevents countries from 
solving collective action problems and undercuts the validity and effectiveness of existing government 
institutions by spurring (in reality or perception) ethnic groups to use them in a partial manner. Thus, 
inequality prevents the emergence of high quality institutions because the people who control the 
development of their own political and economic institutions do not want to allow others to close the 
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gap by improving their own position. Ethnic diversity, on the other hand, leads to a struggle between 
competing factions that can cause worse economic outcomes even if one group does not have complete 
control over the governmental resources. As in the inequality literature, the importance of ethnic 
diversity in long-run development works by interfering with the development of appropriate market-
supporting institutions and the provision of public goods.  
We provide evidence that ethnic fractionalization has a greater effect on economic development 
than income inequality.  Although when the endogeneity of fractionalization is not considered, income 
inequality is associated with negative development outcomes, high income inequality is not a sufficient 
condition to lead to worse economic outcomes.  In addition to showing that ethnic fractionalization 
affects the level of income, we also show that it affects investment in schooling.  In our estimations, 
ethnic fractionalization has a strong negative effect on secondary school enrollment rates, while 
inequality has an insignificant and often positive impact. This result challenges the notion that elites will 
simply restrict access to public goods in order to maintain their privileged position. There are several 
reasons why elites may not block access to public education based simply on income differences.  First, 
income differences could be insufficient motivation for a person to be willing to view the success of 
their group or (or himself) separately from the success of a country as a whole. Second, elites may 
simply lack the power to restrict public good provisions based on income. Finally, recent work in 
Unified Growth Theory argues that elites (or at least some portion of elites) benefit from having a more 
well-educated public (Galor and Moav, 2006; Galor, 2005; Golar, Moav and Vollrath, 2009). Instead, 
the results confirm the notion that ethnic differences prevent societies from overcoming the collective 
action problems inherent in providing public goods.  
Another set of results suggests that ethnic fractionalization also effects income via the 
development of institutional quality.  As above, we don’t find that income inequality in general 
consistently affects institutions in a statistically significant way.  The results for ethnic fractionalization, 
however, show many signs of persistent conflict in the development of effective institutions.  These 
struggles manifest themselves in high levels of corruption and regulatory interference in the market and 
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inefficient provision of services by the government bureaucracy and justice systems, all of which could 
results from ethnic groups attempting to use the government to extract rents from opposing segments of 
society. Similarly, lower scores on the “voice and accountability” measure could be the result of 
entrenched ethnic interests preventing real electoral competition. Finally, the relationship between ethnic 
fractionalization and “political stability and violence” is likely a response of the inability of diverse 
societies to mediate problems through established political channels.  
4 Conclusion 
 We provide evidence that ethnic heterogeneity is better able to explain differences in income 
levels, school enrollment rates, and institutional quality than income inequality. Our results suggest that 
the nature of divisions in society may be particularly important in determining the effects of inequality 
on development.   
We have provided evidence that ethnic fractionalization, rather than income inequality in 
general, is the major driving force behind differing paths to political and economic development. The 
results also suggest that ethnic differences have an important role to play in the literature on political 
transition (e.g. Engerman and Sokoloff, 2005; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2000, 2001, 2006). These 
results add to a long literature identifying the negative effects of ethnic fractionalization (e.g. Easterly 
and Levine, 1997; Alesina et al, 2003; Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005). Indeed, our results have 
implications for all regressions using the level of income as the dependent variable by implying that 
ethnic fractionalization must be treated as endogenous. 
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Table 1: Land Endowments, Inequality and Fractionalization 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 GINI INCSHARE FRAC 
    
LWHEATSUGAR -18.33*** -19.13*** -0.441*** 
 (3.279) (2.992) (0.0961) 
Constant 44.55*** 49.28*** 0.478*** 
 (0.923) (0.798) (0.0244) 
    
Observations 118 114 118 
R-squared 0.169 0.216 0.131 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Table 2: Base Results with Inequality and Fractionalization Entering Separately 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 LNGDPPC02 GOVERNANCE SCHOOL LNGDPPC02 GOVERNANCE SCHOOL LNGDPPC02 GOVERNANCE SCHOOL 
          
Panel A: LWHEATSUGAR as Only Instrument 
GINI -0.121*** -0.0914*** -4.891***       
 (0.0269) (0.0200) (0.960)       
INCSHARE    -0.127*** -0.0975*** -4.795***    
    (0.0292) (0.0200) (0.876)    
FRAC       -4.791*** -3.798*** -184.5*** 
       (1.050) (0.819) (33.97) 
Constant 13.03*** 3.910*** 278.3*** 13.89*** 4.658*** 296.8*** 9.935*** 1.657*** 149.7*** 
 (1.132) (0.847) (39.44) (1.388) (0.951) (40.60) (0.483) (0.359) (14.52) 
          
Observations 97 118 113 96 114 110 97 118 113 
OIR          
FS F-Stat 27.42 31.23 28.80 31.24 40.90 37.74 20.49 21.05 25.48 
FS P-Value 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 
Endog 0.0001*** 0.0002*** 0.0000*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0000*** 0.0017*** 0.0007*** 0.0001*** 
          
          
Panel B: LWHEATSUGAR and Tropical as Instruments  
GINI -0.123*** -0.0961*** -4.933***       
 (0.0281) (0.0208) (0.981)       
INCSHARE    -0.128*** -0.0982*** -4.695***    
    (0.0297) (0.0202) (0.848)    
FRAC       -4.156*** -3.446*** -179.5*** 
       (0.856) (0.703) (33.22) 
Constant 13.12*** 4.117*** 279.8*** 13.94*** 4.687*** 291.7*** 9.639*** 1.501*** 146.8*** 
 (1.187) (0.880) (40.35) (1.411) (0.961) (39.28) (0.393) (0.315) (13.93) 
          
Observations 95 116 111 95 113 109 95 116 111 
OIR 0.6308 0.5885 0.2188 0.3071 0.3022 0.0835* 0.3215 0.3320 0.8884 
FS F-Stat 12.98 15.01 13.92 15.44 20.45 19.08 13.51 13.02 14.39 
FS P-Value 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 
Endog 0.0000*** 0.0001*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0054*** 0.0007*** 0.0001*** 
Estimated via  2SLS.  Robust standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. OIR is the p-value for the Hansen’s J test of the exclusion 
restriction. FS F-Stat and FS P-Value are the F-Statistic and P-value from the first stage regression. Endog is the p-value from the test of endogeneity. Under the 
null hypothesis, the variable can be treated as exogenous. The test is calculated as the difference between the Sargan-Hansen statistics when treating the variable 
of interest as endogenous or exogenous.    
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Table 3: Effects of Fractionalization with Controls 
 LNGDPPC02 GOVERNANCE SCHOOL 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
FRAC -6.561* -4.479*** -5.852*** -4.406** -5.369** -4.274*** -4.888*** -4.047*** -189.0*** -182.3*** -211.2*** -132.4*** 
 (3.424) (1.198) (1.734) (1.777) (2.711) (1.099) (1.416) (1.376) (70.49) (44.12) (63.49) (36.38) 
Tropical 0.744    0.542    2.928    
 (1.045)    (0.767)    (21.72)    
Commodity  -0.238    0.298    -1.510   
  (0.295)    (0.290)    (12.56)   
British 
Heritage   0.784    0.612    31.73  
   (0.790)    (0.625)    (27.09)  
French 
Heritage   0.507    0.206    19.55  
   (0.643)    (0.522)    (23.22)  
Soc. 
Heritage   0.0745    -0.332    18.75  
   (0.636)    (0.457)    (18.27)  
Middle 
East/Africa    -0.348    0.176    -27.78** 
    (0.558)    (0.401)    (10.93) 
South & 
East Asia    -0.579    -0.299    -26.11*** 
    (0.365)    (0.253)    (9.232) 
Western 
Hemisphere    0.118    0.195    -4.077 
    (0.457)    (0.324)    (9.677) 
Constant 10.43*** 9.859*** 9.894*** 9.967*** 2.163** 1.792*** 1.935*** 1.725*** 150.0*** 149.1*** 139.7*** 141.7*** 
 (1.191) (0.502) (0.556) (0.533) (0.949) (0.439) (0.397) (0.458) (24.69) (16.79) (14.53) (12.05) 
             
Observations 95 97 96 97 116 118 114 118 111 113 110 113 
FS F-Stat 3.40 14.95 9.41 6.64 3.93 13.74 9.76 8.51 6.62 16.06 9.97 9.92 
FS P-Value 0.0683* 0.0002*** 0.0028*** 0.0115** 0.0499** 0.0003*** 0.0023*** 0.0043*** 0.0114** 0.0001*** 0.0021*** 0.0021*** 
Endog 0.0173** 0.0040*** 0.0012*** 0.0226** 0.0114** 0.0009*** 0.0001*** 0.0135** 0.0077*** 0.0004*** 0.0025*** 0.0074*** 
Estimated via 2SLS.  Robust standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. FS F-Stat and FS P-Value are the F-Statistic and P-value from the 
first stage regression. Endog is the p-value from the test of endogeneity. Under the null hypothesis, the variable can be treated as exogenous. The test is 
calculated as the difference between the Sargan-Hansen statistics when treating the variable of interest as endogenous or exogenous.  LWHEATSUGAR is the 
only instrument.  
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Table 4:  Reduced Form Estimates of Inequality and Fractionalization  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 FRAC FRAC FRAC GINI GINI GINI INCSHARE INCSHARE INCSHARE 
          
SD of State History 0.181 0.324 0.108 34.61*** 38.72*** 30.20*** 27.43*** 25.06** 22.55*** 
 (0.236) (0.316) (0.236) (8.485) (12.81) (8.567) (7.968) (11.83) (7.763) 
Ln(abs(latitude)) -0.101*** -0.104*** -0.0882*** -2.254** -1.094 -1.024 -2.304*** -0.592 -1.047 
 (0.0190) (0.0239) (0.0197) (0.896) (1.028) (1.009) (0.834) (0.958) (0.927) 
Ln(Dist to a Coast or River) 0.0566*** 0.0517*** 0.0548*** 0.231 -0.377 0.247 0.457 -0.233 0.508 
 (0.0160) (0.0173) (0.0161) (0.564) (0.569) (0.563) (0.493) (0.482) (0.484) 
State History -0.109 -0.0390 -0.103 -7.586** -4.420 -8.460*** -4.741* -2.927 -5.681** 
 (0.0947) (0.0937) (0.0943) (3.003) (3.425) (2.868) (2.777) (2.961) (2.703) 
Middle East/Africa  0.0399   7.844***   9.635***  
  (0.0627)   (2.204)   (2.110)  
East and South Asia  -0.0730   0.585   3.430  
  (0.0618)   (2.476)   (2.177)  
Western Hemisphere  -0.0429   2.522   6.090**  
  (0.0680)   (2.897)   (2.713)  
British Heritage   0.213***   4.203*   3.147 
   (0.0749)   (2.261)   (2.039) 
French Heritage   0.156**   5.427***   5.164*** 
   (0.0683)   (1.839)   (1.751) 
Socialist Heritage   0.142**   -0.311   -1.807 
   (0.0672)   (2.024)   (1.878) 
Constant 0.476*** 0.477*** 0.293** 48.07*** 42.86*** 41.86*** 51.08*** 43.99*** 45.32*** 
 (0.129) (0.130) (0.130) (5.080) (5.363) (5.491) (4.567) (4.934) (4.959) 
          
Observations 116 116 111 116 116 111 113 113 110 
R-squared 0.362 0.381 0.413 0.336 0.426 0.387 0.288 0.426 0.364 
Robust Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Table 5: The “Horserace” with the Gini Coefficient 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 LNGDPPC LNGDPPC LNGDPPC GOVERNANCE GOVERNANCE GOVERNANCE SCHOOL SCHOOL SCHOOL 
GINI 0.121** 0.117** 0.144** 0.0334 0.0406 0.0294 3.305* 2.784* 3.982* 
 (0.0548) (0.0569) (0.0690) (0.0287) (0.0370) (0.0336) (1.826) (1.578) (2.045) 
FRAC -7.421*** -4.328*** -6.824*** -3.935*** -3.097*** -3.827*** -216.5*** -102.8*** -190.8*** 
 (1.727) (1.478) (1.749) (0.926) (0.936) (0.873) (55.74) (33.86) (52.74) 
Adjusted State History 1.145 1.692** 1.405 0.121 0.397 0.0605 29.43 37.96* 42.66 
 (0.970) (0.745) (1.174) (0.483) (0.446) (0.560) (28.00) (20.44) (33.11) 
Middle East/Africa  -1.575***   -0.476   -55.50***  
  (0.583)   (0.348)   (14.90)  
East and South Asia  -1.459***   -0.537**   -38.38***  
  (0.429)   (0.255)   (11.45)  
Western Hemisphere  -1.019   -0.402   -35.57**  
  (0.671)   (0.413)   (17.74)  
British Heritage   -0.518   -0.0931   -7.458 
   (0.938)   (0.480)   (27.36) 
French Heritage   -0.998   -0.446   -21.67 
   (0.881)   (0.472)   (25.68) 
Socialist Heritage   -0.682   -0.694*   6.982 
   (0.628)   (0.361)   (18.10) 
Constant 6.072*** 5.582*** 5.378* 0.250 -0.217 0.749 10.50 11.70 -26.06 
 (2.147) (2.110) (2.887) (1.096) (1.322) (1.396) (69.21) (59.57) (84.92) 
          
Observations 116 116 111 117 117 112 112 112 108 
OIR 0.7212 0.7642 0.6613 0.8039 0.5138 0.8385 0.3713 0.4701 0.5179 
AP F-Stat (GINI) 11.66 5.35 7.50 11.78 5.78 7.68 9.53 4.94 6.50 
AP P-Value (GINI) 0.0000*** 0.0061*** 0.0009*** 0.0000*** 0.0041*** 0.0008*** 0.0002*** 0.0089*** 0.0022*** 
AP F-Stat (FRAC) 9.98 9.75 11.21 10.15 10.39 11.61 8.93 10.01 10.52 
AP P-Value (FRAC) 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0000*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0000*** 0.0003*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 
Kleibergen-Paap F-Stat 5.26++ 3.58+ 4.94++ 5.38++ 3.90++ 5.02++ 4.50++ 3.31+ 4.18++ 
Shea’s Partial R2 (GINI) 0.1387 0.1046 0.1151 0.1403 0.1131 0.1178 0.1183 0.1013 0.1000 
Adjusted Shea’s Partial R2 (GINI) 0.1156 0.0553 0.0640 0.1175 0.0647 0.0674 0.0938 0.0499 0.1898 
Shea’s Partial R2 (FRAC) 0.1720 0.1848 0.2007 0.1731 0.1913 0.2022 0.1612 0.1919 0.0465 
Adjusted Shea’s Partial R2 (FRAC) 0.1498 0.1399 0.1546 0.1511 0.1472 0.1566 0.1379 0.1458 0.1417 
Endog (GINI) 0.0047*** 0.0071*** 0.0104** 0.0385** 0.0759* 0.0796* 0.0160** 0.0505* 0.0201** 
Endog (FRAC) 0.0032*** 0.0552* 0.0994* 0.6781 0.0215** 0.6152 0.1422 0.0597* 0.1911 
Estimated via LIML.  Robust Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0. The instruments are the log of mean distance to a river or coast, the 
log of the absolute value of latitude and the standard  deviation of Adjusted State History. AP F-Stats are the Angrist-Pishcke (2009) first stage F-Stats. OIR is 
the p-value of the test of the overidentification restriction. Endog is the p-value from the test of endogeneity. Under the null hypothesis, the variable can be 
treated as exogenous. The Kleibergen-Paap F-Stat is a joint test for weak instruments, which can be compared to the Stock and Yogo (2005) critical values. 
+++,++, and + indicate that, at the 5% significance level, the maximal size of the Wald test is less than .10, .15, and .20, respectively.
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Table 6: The “Horserace” with the Income Share of the Richest Quintile 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 LNGDPPC LNGDPPC LNGDPPC GOVERNANCE GOVERNANCE GOVERNANCE SCHOOL SCHOOL SCHOOL 
INCSHARE 0.160** 0.179* 0.202* 0.0400 0.0577 0.0418 4.585 4.614 5.707* 
 (0.0813) (0.103) (0.112) (0.0382) (0.0603) (0.0500) (2.975) (3.156) (3.459) 
FRAC -8.137*** -4.030** -7.674*** -4.057*** -2.871*** -3.964*** -242.1*** -93.84** -214.2*** 
 (2.241) (1.576) (2.185) (1.085) (0.914) (1.008) (79.47) (39.39) (67.30) 
Adjusted State History 0.877 1.701** 1.261 0.0405 0.409 0.0503 23.97 40.76 40.35 
 (1.053) (0.862) (1.322) (0.484) (0.474) (0.581) (31.37) (25.55) (38.10) 
Middle East/Africa  -2.459**   -0.814   -80.22**  
  (1.020)   (0.566)   (31.87)  
East and South Asia  -2.032***   -0.774**   -53.68***  
  (0.613)   (0.322)   (18.23)  
Western Hemisphere  -1.854   -0.709   -59.15*  
  (1.159)   (0.654)   (35.51)  
British Heritage   -0.382   -0.0841   -4.963 
   (1.044)   (0.494)   (30.64) 
French Heritage   -1.143   -0.488   -25.97 
   (1.082)   (0.517)   (31.60) 
Socialist Heritage   -0.183   -0.557   20.88 
   (0.791)   (0.404)   (23.44) 
Constant 4.087 2.594 2.326 -0.114 -1.079 0.0946 -51.61 -76.29 -115.6 
 (3.339) (4.184) (4.978) (1.553) (2.423) (2.216) (119.6) (132.1) (152.4) 
          
Observations 113 113 110 114 114 111 110 110 107 
OIR 0.6235 0.8281 0.7304 0.9576 0.5840 0.8227 0.4070 0.4861 0.6325 
AP F-Stat (INC) 8.75 2.76 4.79 8.83 3.07 4.98 7.07 2.51 4.06 
AP P-Value (INC) 0.0003*** 0.0678* 0.0103** 0.0003*** 0.0503* 0.0086*** 0.0013*** 0.0862* 0.0202** 
AP F-Stat (FRAC) 7.67 10.35 8.75 7.77 11.12 9.21 6.56 11.23 8.15 
AP P-Value (FRAC) 0.0008*** 0.0001*** 0.0003*** 0.0007*** 0.0000*** 0.0002*** 0.0021*** 0.0000*** 0.0005*** 
Kleibergen-Paap F-Stat 3.69+ 1.87 3.08 3.79+ 2.10 3.19 3.08 1.69 2.56 
Shea’s Partial R2 (INC) 0.0933 0.0555 0.0712 0.0946 0.0628 0.0747 0.0769 0.0519 0.0605 
Adjusted Shea’s Partial R2 (INC) 0.0683 0.0020 0.0170 0.0699 0.0103 0.0213 0.0507 -0.0033 0.0041 
Shea’s Partial R2 (FRAC) 0.1354 0.1990 0.1629 0.1368 0.2070 0.1674 0.1199 0.2086 0.1553 
Adjusted Shea’s Partial R2 (FRAC) 0.1116 0.1537 0.1141 0.1132 0.1625 0.1194 0.0950 0.1625 0.1046 
Endog (INC) 0.0021*** 0.0089*** 0.0063*** 0.0319** 0.1042 0.0645* 0.0110** 0.0697* 0.0127** 
Endog (FRAC) 0.0896* 0.1098 0.3655 0.0071*** 0.4816 0.5068 0.9745 0.2252 0.5025 
Estimated via LIML.  Robust Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0. The instruments are the log of mean distance to a river or coast, the 
log of the absolute value of latitude and the standard  deviation of Adjusted State History. AP F-Stats are the Angrist-Pishcke (2009) first stage F-Stats. OIR is 
the p-value of the test of the overidentification restriction. Endog is the p-value from the test of endogeneity. Under the null hypothesis, the variable can be 
treated as exogenous. The Kleibergen-Paap F-Stat is a joint test for weak instruments, which can be compared to the Stock and Yogo (2005) critical values. 
+++,++, and + indicate that, at the 5% significance level, the maximal size of the Wald test is less than .10, .15, and .20, respectively.
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Table 7A: Breaking Down Institutions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 VOICE VOICE VOICE STABILITY STABILITY STABILITY GOVEFFECT GOVEFFECT GOVEFFECT 
GINI 0.0729* 0.0580 0.0694 0.0328 0.0349 0.0387 0.0217 0.0494 0.0114 
 (0.0399) (0.0493) (0.0447) (0.0359) (0.0435) (0.0438) (0.0343) (0.0455) (0.0392) 
FRAC -5.327*** -3.680*** -4.990*** -5.228*** -4.225*** -4.941*** -4.219*** -3.583*** -4.272*** 
 (1.327) (1.287) (1.233) (1.164) (1.127) (1.109) (1.099) (1.154) (1.028) 
Adjusted State History 0.168 0.290 0.145 -0.437 -0.272 -0.339 0.449 0.909* 0.295 
 (0.692) (0.548) (0.771) (0.637) (0.614) (0.741) (0.525) (0.538) (0.617) 
Middle East/Africa  -0.763*   -0.558   -0.535  
  (0.454)   (0.456)   (0.419)  
East and South Asia  -0.728**   -0.466   -0.576*  
  (0.327)   (0.338)   (0.304)  
Western Hemisphere  -0.317   -0.385   -0.674  
  (0.514)   (0.499)   (0.516)  
British Heritage   -0.127   -0.112   0.0190 
   (0.639)   (0.598)   (0.571) 
French Heritage   -0.578   -0.414   -0.546 
   (0.625)   (0.579)   (0.561) 
Socialist Heritage   -0.787*   -0.213   -1.010** 
   (0.477)   (0.441)   (0.440) 
Constant -0.848 -0.548 -0.420 0.963 0.700 0.778 0.720 -0.534 1.686 
 (1.509) (1.706) (1.837) (1.415) (1.635) (1.832) (1.291) (1.633) (1.618) 
          
Observations 117 117 112 117 117 112 117 117 112 
OIR 0.7389 0.3507 0.9968 0.9125 0.6826 0.8950 0.7653 0.5905 0.7120 
AP F-Stat (GINI) 11.78 5.78 7.68 11.78 5.78 7.68 11.78 5.78 7.68 
AP P-Value (GINI) 0.0000*** 0.0041*** 0.0008*** 0.0000*** 0.0041*** 0.0008*** 0.0000*** 0.0041*** 0.0008*** 
AP F-Stat (FRAC) 10.15 10.39 11.61 10.15 10.39 11.61 10.15 10.39 11.61 
AP P-Value (FRAC) 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0000*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0000*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0000*** 
Kleibergen-Paap F-Stat 5.38++ 3.90++ 5.02++ 5.38++ 3.90++ 5.02++ 5.38++ 3.90++ 5.02++ 
Shea’s Partial R2 (GINI) 0.1403 0.1131 0.1178 0.1403 0.1131 0.1178 0.1403 0.1131 0.1178 
Adjusted Shea’s Partial R2 (GINI) 0.1175 0.0647 0.0674 0.1175 0.0647 0.0674 0.1175 0.0647 0.0674 
Shea’s Partial R2 (FRAC) 0.1731 0.1913 0.2022 0.1731 0.1913 0.2022 0.1731 0.1913 0.2022 
Adjusted Shea’s Partial R2 (FRAC) 0.1511 0.1472 0.1566 0.1511 0.1472 0.1566 0.1511 0.1472 0.1566 
Endog (GINI) 0.0099*** 0.0759* 0.0207** 0.0864* 0.1720 0.1083 0.0954* 0.0585* 0.2030 
Endog (FRAC) 0.0055*** 0.0276** 0.2439 0.0197** 0.0311** 0.6730 0.0006*** 0.0165** 0.9688 
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Table 7B:  Breaking Down Institutions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 REGQUAL REGQUAL REGQUAL RULELAW RULELAW RULELAW CORRUPT CORRUPT CORRUPT 
GINI 0.0543 0.0627 0.0457 0.0231 0.0518 0.0177 0.0224 0.0435 0.0202 
 (0.0368) (0.0494) (0.0415) (0.0328) (0.0436) (0.0388) (0.0331) (0.0459) (0.0449) 
FRAC -4.755*** -3.463*** -4.506*** -4.276*** -3.703*** -4.294*** -4.253*** -3.733*** -4.550*** 
 (1.243) (1.287) (1.133) (1.058) (1.126) (1.027) (1.021) (1.111) (1.065) 
Adjusted State History 0.284 0.626 0.197 0.435 0.949* 0.314 0.303 0.871 0.137 
 (0.622) (0.563) (0.697) (0.550) (0.552) (0.642) (0.561) (0.551) (0.708) 
Middle East/Africa  -0.751*   -0.482   -0.309  
  (0.436)   (0.408)   (0.430)  
East and South Asia  -0.754**   -0.620*   -0.719**  
  (0.308)   (0.321)   (0.327)  
Western Hemisphere  -0.576   -0.663   -0.503  
  (0.527)   (0.504)   (0.530)  
British Heritage   -0.113   -0.162   -0.214 
   (0.580)   (0.550)   (0.624) 
French Heritage   -0.518   -0.663   -0.641 
   (0.564)   (0.528)   (0.610) 
Socialist Heritage   -0.810*   -1.115***   -1.302*** 
   (0.443)   (0.412)   (0.463) 
Constant -0.307 -0.891 0.395 0.660 -0.645 1.507 0.713 -0.333 1.611 
 (1.400) (1.745) (1.721) (1.247) (1.556) (1.605) (1.279) (1.652) (1.859) 
          
Observations 117 117 112 117 117 112 117 117 112 
OIR 0.6524 0.3425 0.9105 0.8484 0.6603 0.6197 0.9832 0.7551 0.3563 
AP F-Stat (GINI) 11.78 5.78 7.68 11.78 5.78 7.68 11.78 5.78 7.68 
AP P-Value (GINI) 0.0000*** 0.0041*** 0.0008*** 0.0000*** 0.0041*** 0.0008*** 0.0000*** 0.0041*** 0.0008*** 
AP F-Stat (FRAC) 10.15 10.39 11.61 10.15 10.39 11.61 10.15 10.39 11.61 
AP P-Value (FRAC) 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0000*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0000*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0000*** 
Kleibergen-Paap F-Stat 5.38++ 3.90++ 5.02++ 5.38++ 3.90++ 5.02++ 5.38++ 3.90++ 5.02++ 
Shea’s Partial R2 (GINI) 0.1403 0.1131 0.1178 0.1403 0.1131 0.1178 0.1403 0.1131 0.1178 
Adjusted Shea’s Partial R2 (GINI) 0.1175 0.0647 0.0674 0.1175 0.0647 0.0674 0.1175 0.0647 0.0674 
Shea’s Partial R2 (FRAC) 0.1731 0.1913 0.2022 0.1731 0.1913 0.2022 0.1731 0.1913 0.2022 
Adjusted Shea’s Partial R2 (FRAC) 0.1511 0.1472 0.1566 0.1511 0.1472 0.1566 0.1511 0.1472 0.1566 
Endog (GINI) 0.0171** 0.0561* 0.0405** 0.0999* 0.0451** 0.1983 0.1721 0.1035 0.3978 
Endog (FRAC) 0.0000*** 0.0283** 0.3178 0.0007*** 0.0122** 0.8943 0.0005*** 0.0097*** 0.9796 
Estimated via LIML.  Robust Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0. The instruments are the log of mean distance to a river or coast, the 
log of the absolute value of latitude and the standard  deviation of Adjusted State History. AP F-Stats are the Angrist-Pishcke (2009) first stage F-Stats. OIR is 
the p-value of the test of the overidentification restriction. Endog is the p-value from the test of endogeneity. Under the null hypothesis, the variable can be 
treated as exogenous. The Kleibergen-Paap F-Stat is a joint test for weak instruments, which can be compared to the Stock and Yogo (2005) critical values. 
+++,++, and + indicate that, at the 5% significance level, the maximal size of the Wald test is less than .10, .15, and .20, respectively.
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Appendix Table 1: Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Description Source 
LNGDPPC02 107 7.924 1.004 5.802 9.625 ln(GDP per capita in 2002) Easterly (2007) 
LNGDPPC 182 8.527 1.302 5.562 11.143 ln(GDP per capita in 2000) WDI 
SCHOOL 120 72.073 34.763 5.672 162.579 Average Secondary Schooling Enrollment Rates 
1998-2002 
Easterly (2007) 
GOVERNANCE 128 0.085 0.784 -1.515 1.632 Aggregate Kaufmann, Kauffman, Kraay and Zoibo 
Governance Measure, 2002 
Easterly (2007) 
FRAC 127 0.427 0.246 0.002 0.930 Probability that two randomly selected individuals 
will be from different entho-linguistic group 
Easterly (2007) 
GINI 135 42.046 9.003 23.970 67.458 Gini Coefficient. Averaged 1960-1998. Easterly (2007) 
INC 129 46.640 8.687 17.573 71.211 Income Share of the Richest Quintile. Averaged 
1960-1998 
Easterly (2007) 
SD of State History 161 0.097 0.089 0.000 0.346 SD of within-country migration-adjusted State 
History 
Putterman and Weil 
(2010) 
Ln(abs(latitude)) 160 2.974 1.000 -0.862 4.314 Ln(abs(latitude) Harvard CID 
Ln(Dist to a Coast or River) 160 5.046 1.296 2.073 7.777 ln (mean distance to nearest coastline or sea-
navigable river (km)) 
Harvard CID 
LWHEATSUGAR 118 0.105 0.205 -0.393 0.578 log[(1+share of arable land suitable for wheat) / 
(1+share of arable land suitable for sugarcane)]. 
Easterly (2007) 
Tropical 121 0.310 0.403 0 1 share of the country's cultivated land area in 
tropical climate zones 
Easterly (2007) 
Commodity 130 0.215 0.413 0 1 commodity exporting dummy Easterly (2007) 
State History 161 0.451 0.263 0 1 migration-adjusted State History Putterman and Weil 
(2010) 
Middle East/Africa 128 0.297 0.459 0 1 Continent Dummy. omitted category is Europe and 
Central Asia is the omitted cateogry 
Easterly (2007) 
East Asia 128 0.188 0.392 0 1 see above. Easterly (2007) 
Western Hemisphere 128 0.211 0.410 0 1 see above. Easterly (2007) 
British Heritage 122 0.303 0.462 0 1 Legal Heritage where German or Scandinavian 
legal origin are the omitted categories 
Easterly (2007) 
French Heritage 122 0.426 0.497 0 1 see above. Easterly (2007) 
Socialist Heritage 122 0.197 0.399 0 1 see above. Easterly (2007) 
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